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PROFESSOR WILLIAM CRAIG'S CRITICISMS 
OF CRITIQUES OF KALAM COSMOLOGICAL 
ARGUMENTS BY PAUL DAVIES, STEPHEN 
HAWKING, AND ADOLF GRUNBAUM 
Graham Oppy 
Kalam cosmological arguments have recently been the subject of criticisms, 
at least inter alia, by physicists-Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking-and phi-
losophers of science-Adolf Grunbaum. In a series of recent articles, William 
Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are "superficial, iII-con-
ceived, and based on' misunderstanding." I argue that, while some of the 
discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, the 
points raised by Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do suffice to undermine the 
dialectical efficacy of kalam cosmological arguments. 
In some recent articles, Professor William Craig (1986) (1990) (1992) has 
argued that critiques of kalam cosmological arguments by Padl Davies, 
Stephen Hawking, and Adolf Grunbaum are superficial, ill-conceived, and 
based on misunderstanding. These judgements seem to me to be unfair. While 
I concede that some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philo-
sophically sophisticated, it seems to me that Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum 
do raise serious difficulties for the view that kalam cosmological arguments 
are rationally compelling pieces of natural theology. Of course, this is not to 
say that Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum offer compelling reasons for Craig 
to give up his belief that kalam cosmological arguments are sound-but it is 
important to see that this is an eptirely separate issue. At several points in 
his critiques, Craig makes things easy for himself by supposing that Davies, 
Hawking and Grunbaum must demonstrate that he-Craig-ought to give up 
his belief in the soundness of the argument; when, in fact, all that Davies, 
Hawking and Grunbaum need to show is that there is no good, non-question-
begging, reason for them to be persuaded that the arguments which Craig 
offers are sound. What is at issue is a choice between two quite different 
kinds of models of the origins of the universe; if it turns out that there are 
no suitably independent reasons for preferring Craig's favoured theistic 
model, then there is sufficient justification for those who wish to pursue 
alternatives. 1 
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We may suppose that the standard form for kalam cosmological arguments 
is as follows: Whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to 
exist; therefore the universe has a cause.2 Different arguments are obtained 
by providing different supporting arguments for the two premises. Both prem-
ises admit of different kinds of subsidiary justification-e.g. by appeal to 
broadly logical or metaphysical arguments or by appeal to the current physi-
cal evidence. Craig contends that there are broadly logical or metaphysical 
arguments, concerning the metaphysical impossibility of physically instanti-
ated infinities, which establish the second premise independently of the cur-
rent physical evidence, though he also holds that the current physical 
evidence strongly supports the second premise. Moreover, Craig contends 
that the first premise is a fundamental metaphysical principle which cannot 
be intelligibly denied, and that there is nothing in the physical evidence which 
suggests that it could conceivably turn out to be false. However, it seems to 
me that one could reasonably reject all of these contentions-and that the 
discussions provided by Davies, Hawking, and Grunbaum all contain impor-
tant clues about how to do so. 
1 
Grunbaum (1990) (1991) worries about the propriety of the claim, that the 
universe began to exist, in the context of classical Big Bang models of the 
origins of the universe. In particular, he considers two cases: (i) models which 
are closed at the Big Bang instant t=O, in which t=O is the location of a 
singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe; and (ii) models 
which are open at the Big Bang instant t=O, in which there is no singular, 
temporally first event in the history of the universe. 
In connection with the first type of model, Grunbaum observes that it is 
misleading to say that in these models the universe began because this sug-
gests that there were moments of time before t=O. Craig (1992:237f.) objects 
that "x begins to exist" should not be analysed as "x exists at time t and there 
are times immediately prior to t at which x does not exist," but rather as "x 
exists at t and there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists." Of 
course, this analysis would commit Craig to the unwanted claim that God 
began to exist-since, on the theistic version of this model, there is no time 
immediately prior to t=O at which God exists-so Craig further suggests that, 
within a theistic context, the analysis should be amended to "x exists at t; 
there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world 
contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence." But this 
amended suggestion invokes the extremely puzzling notion of "(God's) time-
less existence." Moreover, even the unamended analysis naturally provokes 
the question whether anything which begins to exist in this sense must have 
a cause. 
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Craig (1992:238) claims that it is "philosophically unobjectionable" to 
conceive of God as causally prior to the Big Bang, since "God's act of 
creation may be regarded as simultaneous with the origin of the universe." 
However-as Grunbaum observes on several occasions-many of us find it 
hard to make any sense of this suggestion. It is true that there are contexts 
in which it clearly makes sense to speak of "simultaneous causation"-e.g. 
as Craig notes, there is no impropriety in the claim that the downward pres-
sure exerted by the otherwise unsupported head causes the indentation in the 
pillow-but this is compatible with the claim that, strictly speaking, causation 
must be local and mediated by finite signals. On this view, given a sufficient 
margin of error, causation can appear simultaneous-but there is no reason 
to think that there is any genuinely simultaneous causation? Of course, the 
above considerations are not incompatible with the view that simultaneous 
causation is narrowly logically possible-but they do suggest that one could 
reasonably hold that simultaneous causation is not broadly logically, or 
metaphysically, possible. Furthermore, even if it is conceded that simultane-
ous causation is broadly logically possible, it is far from clear that we can 
make sense of the idea that the creative actions of a rational agent could be 
simultaneous with the effects of those actions. In particular, it seems plausible 
to think that the creative actions of rational agents require lapses of time 
between the formation of appropriate intentions and the carrying out of those 
intentions. At the very least, Craig'S "philosophically unobjectionable" con-
ception involves the application of a range of concepts to a situation which 
lacks many of the features which characterise all situations in which many 
of us ordinarily apply those concepts. 
Of course, there is much more which could be said here. However, the most 
important point to note is that many obviously reasonable people find it far 
easier to believe that the universe has no cause than to believe that the 
universe was instantaneously created by a supernatural agent. In order to give 
these people a reason to change their minds, Craig needs to make clear to 
them both (a) that it is metaphysically impossible for the universe to have no 
cause; and (b) that it is metaphysically possible that the universe was instan-
taneously created by a supernatural agent. Here, it seems to me that Grun-
baum is clearly in the right: it is very hard to see how one could formulate a 
good, non-question-begging argument for the view that a closed Big Bang 
universe requires a cause. Reasonable people can differ about ever so many 
things; here is one. 
In connection with the second type of model, Grunbaum observes that, 
since there is no first moment of time, it is correct to say that the universe 
has always existed, and not correct to say that the universe began to exist. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it seems that Craig ought to agree with this judgement; 
for, following his analysis discussed above, there is no time to of which it is 
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true both (i) that the universe exists at to; and (ii) there is no time immediately 
prior to to at which x exists. No doubt, Craig would object that this is to 
countenance physically instantiated infinities of a particularly objectionable 
kind-since it suggests a temporal model which is analogous to certain kinds 
of infinity machines-but it should hardly comes as news to him that Grun-
baum is prepared to countenance such models. Craig (1992-239) also claims 
that Grunbaum's objection is "mere word play-the key concept here is 
permanence, and that is a much more subtle issue than Grunbaum allows. 
The universe has 'always' existed in the sense that there is no past moment 
of physical time at which it did not exist; but it has not always existed in the 
strong sense of being permanent, since it had a beginning of its existence." 
But as we have just seen, this isn't correct: even by Craig's own lights, it 
isn't necessarily true that a temporally finite universe begins to exist-unless, 
of course, there are successful objections to physically instantiated infinities. 
Given the subtlety and care of Grunbaum's well-known defences of the pos-
sibility of various kinds of physically instantiated infinities, I conclude that 
here it is Craig, not Grunbaum, who is guilty of superficiality. 
On the basis of the above discussion, I conclude that Grunbaum does raise 
a legitimate worry about the conjunction of the premises in the kalam cos-
mological argument. A non-theist may concede that there is a sense in which 
everything which begins to exist has a cause, namely: that for each thing 
which begins to exist, there is an earlier state of the universe which caused 
that thing to come into being; and a non-theist may concede that there is a 
sense in which the universe began to exist, namely: that it is finite in time; 
but a non-theist almost certainly will not concede-what is required for the 
kalam cosmological argument-that anything which is temporally finite has 
a cause. As Grunbaum claims, slipperiness in such notions as "beginning to 
exist," "create," etc. helps to give the kalam cosmological argument an air 
of cogency which it does not genuinely possess.4 
2 
Da vies (1983) raises objections to the first premise of the argument. As Craig 
(1986:165) puts it, what he hopes to show is that "it is physically possible 
that the universe originated uncaused out of nothing, space-time springing 
spontaneously into being in accordance with a theory of quantum gravity." 
A natural first thought is that the spontaneous production of subatomic 
particles in a vacuum fluctuation is an instance of things beginning to exist 
uncaused. However, while it may be true that these vacuum fluctuations lack 
efficient causes, it is certainly not true-as both Davies and Craig note-that 
they lack material causes: these processes merely involve the possibly un-
caused conversion of pre-existing energy into material form. Perhaps the 
same is true of the spontaneous production of virtual particles in the quantum-
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mechanical vacuum-though here the issue seems much less clear. At the 
very least, it seems to me that, in virtue of its treatment of the spontaneous 
production of virtual particles in the quantum-mechanical vacuum, current 
physics may already tell us that it is possible for thin~s to begin to exist 
uncaused, i.e. without either material or efficient cause. 
A natural second thought is that, even if there are no processes in nature 
in which things begin to exist without material causes, nonetheless, there may 
be reason to think that the universe could have evolved from a state of zero 
mass-energy without violating conversation of mass-energy, provided that the 
total mass-energy of the universe-ignoring the fluctuating contribution of 
the quantum-mechanical vacuum-is zero.6 Craig [1986:165] objects: "Davies' 
examples [of the spontaneous production of subatomic particles in a vacuum 
fluctuation] only serve to underscore that ex nihilo creation is not at issue 
here: in an intense electric field surrounding an atomic nucleus no new input of 
energy is required for spontaneous pair production when the negative energy 
generated by the new pair of particles offsets the energy of their masses." But 
this is irrelevant: in the case under consideration, there is no prior state from 
which the system evolves-rather a system with neither efficient nor material 
cause evolves in such a way as to preserve certain zero sums. 
Admittedly, Davies muddies the water by suggesting that the evolving 
system evolved "out of empty space" by a quantum conversion of the energy 
of the curved space into matter, on the analogy of pair production. For this 
suggests that "empty space" should be invested with some kind of reality, to 
parallel the role of the vacuum in pair production. And, as Craig points out, 
there are numerous questions which are raised by this suggestion-e.g. 
whether the notion of empty space-time is compatible with relationalist ac-
counts of space-time; whether one can be justified in accepting substantivalist 
accounts of space-time; etc. However, it seems to me that this is an unchari-
table construal of Davies' suggestion. What he ought to be taken to be sug-
gesting is that a quantum theory of gravity might provide the foundations for 
a descriptive account of the uncaused evolution of space-time.7 
Craig [1986:169] claims that Davies is faced by a fundamental dilemma: 
"Either the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of 
spacetime existed or not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if not, 
then it would seem ontologically impossible that being should arise out of 
absolute non-being." But-harking back to the discussion of the previous 
section-it should be noted that many non-theists would object to the idea 
that their position can be encapsulated in the slogan that "being arises out of 
absolute non-being." On the view in question, the universe does not "arise" 
from anything: there are no external conditions-necessary, sufficient, or 
otherwise-which need be invoked in a complete explanation of the evolution 
of the universe. 
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It should be noted that it might be possible to hold a less onto logically 
spartan view of the origins of the universe than the one sketched above. In 
particular, it seems that one might take the universe to be a distribution of 
properties across an at-Ieast-four-dimensional manifold, and also hold that 
time is merely a local phenomenon-Leo that none of the dimensions of the 
manifold is essentially temporal. Those parts of the manifoid which are non-
temporal might be able to provide an explanation of the origins of the tem-
poral parts. Of course, this picture still leaves one with an ontic surd; but 
then so does Craig'S version of theism.8 Moreover, one might not wish to 
embrace the four-or-more-dimensionalism and substantivalism which seem 
to be required. However, it seems dubious that Craig's kind of theist is 
well-placed to make this kind of objection: for it is surely clear that his theism 
is no better placed in point of commitment to controversial metaphysical 
doctrine. 
Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that often when physicists talk about 
"explanation," what they mean is "subsumption under a mathematical 
model." In this mode of talk, the evolution of the universe is "explained" 
provided that one has a set of equations which correctly predicts the currently 
available evidence. Of course, this notion of explanation will hardly be ac-
ceptable to a metaphysician; and it leaves open the question of how best to 
assign ontological commitments to the theories in question in order to get 
explanations in a more substantial sense. While this is a controversial matter, 
it is not clear that there is a way of making such an assignment on which it 
turns out that Craig's favoured position has the minimal commitments which 
he supposes that it has.9 The problem is that Craig requires that the physical 
theories are ontically committed to the temporal boundedness of the uni-
verse-Leo it won't do for his purposes to allow merely that the theories 
assign, say, instrumental utility to that hypothesis. However, it is far from 
clear that Craig can get a suitably grounded commitment to the reality of 
the initial space-time singularity-or even to the reality of the very early 
stages of the standard cosmological models-without taking on the commit-
ments which he seeks to disparage in his opponents. Consequently, it is not 
clear that his theism is even as well placed as the naturalism of his opponents 
in point of commitment to controversial metaphysical doctrine. Moreover, 
if we use a Quinean criterion to measure ontic commitment, then it seems 
fairly plausible to suggest that Craig's theism must carry an extra ontic load, 
allegedly justified by the further explanatory power which it provides. 
3 
Hawking (1988) raises objections to the second premise of the argument. As 
Craig (1990:478) puts it, he "challenges the assumption that a beginningless 
universe entails an infinite past." Now, in fact, as we have already seen, there 
CRITIQUES OF KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS 243 
is an easy way to challenge this assumption, by countenancing models which 
are both bounded and open in the past. But, of course, this challenge does 
not amount to much in the context of the attempt to produce physically 
realistic models of the universe which are beginningless and yet finite. The 
achievement of Hartle and Hawking is to have produced a physically plausi-
ble model of the universe which has these features-i.e. to use the mathe-
matical formalism of quantum field theory and general relativity to generate 
a model of the universe in which space-time is a four-dimensional analogue 
of the surface of a sphere. In this model-which, as far as I know, has not 
yet been shown to be inconsistent with the available evidence-space-time 
is finite, but possesses no initial or terminal singularities. 
Craig objects to various features of Hawking's model including: (i) its use 
of Feynman's sum-over-histories approach to quantum field theory; (ii) its 
use of "imaginary time" in summing the waves for particle histories; and (iii) 
its alleged reliance on the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. In particular, Craig (1990:483) claims that Hawking's need to treat the 
resulting model as physically realistic entails that his use of these devices 
involves him in dubious metaphysical commitments and "egregious self-de-
ception." However, these alleged problems do not seem to be very pressing. 
It is true that a realistic interpretation of Hawking's model requires some kind 
of commitment to the reality of the space over which the histories are 
summed-but this implies no further commitment to a realistic interpretation 
of the formalism of quantum mechanics. In particular, pace Craig (1990:480), 
it does not require commitment to the claim that "an elementary particle 
really does follow all possible space-time paths."l0 Moreover, it may be that 
all that is required is a commitment to the instantiation of certain kinds of 
spatial relations-i.e. it is far from clear that Hawking is committed to a 
substantivalist interpretation of the space over which the histories are 
summed. For similar reasons, Hawking's use of "imaginary time" seems 
innocuous, especially since it is modelled on the standard formalism for the 
description of quantum-mechanical tunnelling. In the end, it may be that all 
that one is really committed to by the Hawking model is the instantiation of 
a particular kind of geometry, where this instantiation can be given either a 
relationist or a substantivalist construal. That this geometry is described using 
complex numbers is neither here nor there. I I 
Craig is especially upset by Ha wking's [1988: 139] suggestion that "the 
so-called imaginary time is really the real time, and that what we call real 
time is just a figment of our imaginations. In real time, the universe has 
a beginning and an end at singularities that form a boundary to space-time 
and at which the laws of science break down. But in imaginary time, there 
are no singularities or boundaries. So maybe what we call imaginary time 
is really more basic, and what we call real is just an idea that we invent 
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to help us describe what we think the universe is like." However, while I 
agree that this formulation of Hawking's view is obnoxious, it seems to me 
that there is a way of restating Hawking's view which makes it more 
palatable. What he ought to say is that what we call "real time" is not a 
physically fundamental property of the universe; i.e. from the standpoint 
of basic physical description, what we call "real time" has the same status 
as "potable water" or "visible light." Of course, contra Hawking, this is 
not to impugn the reality of real time-and nor is it to impugn the reality 
of the singularities in real time-though it will, I think, require the insis-
tence that real time is merely a local feature of the universe. Since, on 
this view, the singularities in real time are properly contained in the uni-
verse, one can be a realist about them without giving up the idea that the 
universe has no boundaries. 
Now, of course, Craig will object that this interpretation of Hawking's 
claim involves "naive ontologising," especially in virtue of features (i)-(iii) 
cited above. However, there are various avenues of reply. First, one might be 
a Quinean about ontological commitment; in that case, one is necessarily 
committed to whatever it is that one's best physical theory quantifies over, 
at least absent consideration of niceties about the possibility of paraphrase. 
As suggested above, this view is not necessarily incompatible with relation-
alism about space-time, though it does seem to sit more naturally with sub-
stantivalism. Second-as suggested in the previous section-one might not 
be a realist about the model and its allegedly problematic features, but then 
insist that, from this standpoint, there is no good reason to be a realist about 
the initial singularities in space-time either. After all, in order to move from 
the observations which we make to the conclusion that there was an initial 
space-time singularity, we need to use a lot of high-powered theory; but, if 
we are instrumentalists about that theory, it is far from clear that we shall be 
entitled to be anything other than instrumentalists about the theoretical con-
clusions which we draw from the theory: that the universe began from a 
space-time singularity is hardly an observational consequence of the theory! 
Either way, the alleged need to invoke God as the best explanation of the 
available evidence seems to be removed. 12 
To sum up: In the abstract, there are two ways in which one can accommo-
date the data which point to an initial singularity while allowing that the 
universe is temporally finite but unbounded, viz.: (i) by excising the singu-
larity; and (ii) by embedding the space which contains the singularity in a 
more extensive, appropriately contoured, manifold. On the former ap-
proach-favoured by Grunbaum-one will simply deny that the resulting 
theory is in any way incomplete. On the latter approach-favoured by Davies 
and, on my construal, Hawking-one will also deny that there is any good 
reason to invoke further entities in order to explain the existence of the 
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entities required by the theory. Either way, it seems that a reasonable propo-
nent of these theories can reasonably resist the conclusion of kalam cosmo-
logical arguments. 
Postscript 
Prompted by some very helpful comments from an anonymous referee for 
Faith and Philosophy, I add here some remarks about the nature of my 
criticisms of Craig's arguments, and, in particular, about my contentions: (i) 
that all Davies, et al. need to show is that there is no good, non-question-
begging reason for them to be persuaded that the arguments which Craig 
offers are sound; and (ii) that Craig's arguments are not rationally compelling 
pieces of natural theology. There are many controversial issues which arise; 
but even the sketchy remarks which I do make will, I think, be of some use. 
The worry raised by the referee is this: It seems plausible to think that no 
"positive" philosophical argument is rationally compelling in the following 
sense: the argument is logically valid, and it would be irrational for someone 
who can see that it is valid, who understands its premises, and who knows 
all of the relevant facts which can be established by everyday methods of 
enquiry and the special sciences, to reject its conclusion. But this seems to 
be the relevant standard of rational compulsion invoked in my assessment of 
Craig's arguments; so all that my arguments show is that Craig's arguments 
fail to pass a test which no philosophical argument has ever passed. Moreover, 
this feature of my argument would not be mitigated even if it were true: (i) 
that Craig writes in such a way as to suggest that his argument is designed 
to meet this standard; and even (ii) that most philosophers write in such a 
way as to suggest that the arguments which they are presenting meet this 
standard. Why should Craig's arguments be criticised for failing to meet a 
standard which philosophical arguments never achieve, even if he seems to 
suggest that his arguments do meet that standard? 
In order to keep my discussion brief, let me grant that no "positive" philo-
sophical argument is rationally compelling in the sense described: no "posi-
tive" philosophical argument can be compelling for all rational beings, 
because the procedural constraints on belief revision which are constitutive 
of rationality do not sufficiently constrain the sets of beliefs which can be 
adopted by reasonable beings. Some alternative conception of the virtue of 
arguments is now required. I suppose that it is something like this: an argu-
ment is provisionally rationally compelling for its intended audience if it is 
logically compelling and proceeds from premises to which the intended audi-
ence is committed; a provisionally rationally compelling argument for an 
intended audience is rationally compelling for that audience if it is also true 
that the audience will accept the conclusion of the argument rather than give 
up one of the premises without violating any of the canons of rationality. 
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I then suppose that the dialectical situation is like this: One begins with 
the assumption that one's dialectical opponents-the intended audi-
ence-are reasonable, in the sense that they respect procedural constraints 
on belief revision, e.g. to aim for consistency, coherence, simplicity, unity, 
explanatory power, etc. One endeavours to construct an argument for the 
conclusion which one wishes to have accepted which is at least provision-
ally rationally compelling for the intended audience. If one is lucky-or 
if one possesses further knowledge about the psychological dispositions 
of one's opponents-one may hit upon an argument which is in fact ra-
tionally compelling for the intended audience. However, even to hit upon 
an argument which is provisionally rationally compelling counts as a suc-
cess: for it forces one's opponent either to accept one's conclusion (out-
right success) or to revise other beliefs (which may then leave room for 
follow-up successes). 
In some circumstances, one will go wrong because one advances arguments 
with premises which one supposes one's opponents will accept-perhaps 
because one thinks that any reasonable person will accept those prem-
ises-when, in fact, it turns out that one's opponents do not accept those 
premises. In such a case, one has two options: one can give up on the argu-
ment; or one can seek to construct arguments for the contentious premises. 
In the former case, one may be led to revise one's opinion of the reasonable-
ness of one's opponent, at least with respect to the subject matter in question: 
perhaps they are insincere, or cognitively divided, or prone to dissociation, 
etc. If so, then one can conclude that one's argument failed through no fault 
of one's own; but one mustn't make the further, mistaken claim, that one's 
own argument prevailed. Once the conditions for debate-including the pos-
session of respect for one's opponents-break down, questions about dialec-
tical success or failure become nugatory. 
How do these remarks bear upon Craig'S kalam cosmological arguments? 
Well, I take it that the intended audience for these arguments consists of 
presumptively reasonable agnostics and atheists who hold a wide range of 
physical and metaphysical beliefs. Moreover, I take it that the members of 
the intended audience are perfectly entitled to draw on those prior physical 
and metaphysical beliefs in responding to Craig's argument. But then, as I 
attempted to show in my paper, it seems quite clear that Craig's argument are 
not even presumptively rationally compelling: they rely on physical and 
metaphysical theses which members ofthe target audience reject. Since I take 
it that Craig is not unaware of this fact, I find it completely mysterious why 
he then continues to advance the arguments. Perhaps Craig could reply that 
his argument is intended just for those atheists and agnostics who buy all of 
the required physical and metaphysical theses; the problem with this line is 
that it is fairly plausible to think that there are no such people. 
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Must all "positive" philosophical argument fall in the same manner as 
Craig's ka/am cosmological arguments? Surely not! In particular, "positive" 
philosophical arguments directed at specific target audiences are very often 
successful: philosophers do modify their positions in response to "positive" 
(and "negative") arguments all the time. Of course, philosophers also modify 
their positions for lots of other reasons as well: it isn't always the force of 
argument which leads to the acceptance of the conclusions of an argument. 
But I don't see any reason, in anything which I have just said, to be sceptical 
about the utility of "positive" philosophical argument. Consider the follow-
ing: (i) Putnam's "twin earth" argument for the view that, in some sense, the 
content of beliefs supervenes on, or is partly determined by, what's outside 
the head; (ii) Black's "two sphere" argument for the view that objects are 
more than bundles of properties; (iii) Mundy's "embedding" arguments for 
the possibility of relationist construals of STR; and (iv) Grunbaum's argument 
that the story of the Thomson lamp is kinematically consistent. I hold that, 
at the times at which these arguments were propounded, at least, these were 
paradigm examples of good "positive" philosophical arguments. Moreover, 
these examples are easily multiplied. 13 
Perhaps it might be objected that I have incorrectly identified the intended 
audience of Craig's argument. In particular, it might be suggested that the 
argument is intended for theists-i.e. people who already accept the conclu-
sion-and that it can show them something about the structure or rationality 
of their own beliefs, or about the structure or irrationality of the beliefs of 
non-theists. I think that these suggestions are massively implausible. Of 
course, theists are committed to the claim that non-theists make a mistake in 
failing to believe that God exists, but it is hard to see how the construction 
of ka/am cosmological arguments could provide evidence of further, inde-
pendent errors which are made by non-theists. In particular, there is a question 
about the robustness of the theistic conclusion vis a vis the physical and 
metaphysical premises of the argument which needs to be addressed. I am 
fairly confident that there are virtually no theists for whom the premises of, 
e.g., ka/am cosmological arguments are more epistemically robust-less open 
to revision, less centrally placed in the web of belief-than the theistic con-
clusion. Or, to put the point another way, I find it quite implausible to think 
that there are theists for whom the belief in the theistic conclusion is depend-
ent upon their acceptance of the premises of a ka/am cosmological argument. 
But then, I take it that the construction of ka/am cosmological arguments 
doesn't really show anything interesting about the structure of theistic beliefs, 
or about the rationality of acceptance of the conclusion of those arguments. 
Nor does the construction of these arguments show anything about the struc-
ture or rationality of non-theistic arguments either. What the arguments do 
show, if valid. is that one could not accept a particular package of physical 
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and metaphysical theses and also reasonably deny that God exists. But, if 
there is no suitably independent attraction in the package of physical and 
metaphysical theses amongst likely target audiences for the argument-i.e. 
attraction which is independent of belief in the conclusion of the argu-
ment-then it seems to me that there will be no real work which the con-
structed argument can do. 14 
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NOTES 
1. My assessment of the dialectical situation is discussed further in an appendix to the 
present paper. See also my Ontological Arguments and Belief in God, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995, and my "Weak Agnosticism Defended," International 
Journalfor Philosophy of Religion, 36, pp. 147-67. 
2. See Craig (1992:235). 
3. Craig (1990:486ff.) suggests that Aspect's experimental work in connection with 
Bell's Theorem appears to show that there are non-local correlations in nature. But other 
interpretations--e.g. in terms of backwards causation-are available. Moreover, as Craig 
notes, it might well be held that the correlations in question are acausal-Le. that the 
synchronised correlations are not cases of simultaneous causation. 
4. Note, by the way, that this is not to say that Craig is unreasonable in supposing that 
the argument is sound-i.e. it is not to say that he should suppose that the argument 
involves a fatal equivocation; rather, it is to say that non-theists can justifiably contend 
that, by their lights, the most plausible construal of the arguments imputes a fatal equi vo-
cation. But, if the argument is not dialectically effective, then it is useless. So this is to 
say that the argument is a failure. 
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5. Note that the virtual particles in question have detectable effects; i.e. it won't do 
simply to dismiss them as unreal. 
6. Here, we are to imagine that there is neither efficient nor material cause; rather, there 
is an uncaused evolution in which certain zero-quantities are preserved. 
7. Here, I pass over Davies' further suggestion that such a theory would entail a certain 
mathematically determined probability that a blob of space would appear where none 
existed before. As Craig notes, this seems to involve an incoherent understanding of the 
notion of something's coming from nothing-incoherent because it supposes that some-
thing which comes from nothing comes from a pre-existent state-and a consequently 
incoherent understanding of the notion of the probability of something's coming from 
nothing. 
8. If Craig replies that God requires no cause because he did not being to exist, the 
non-theist can make the same point about the non-temporal parts of the manifold. 
9. Recall that one of Craig's gambits is to object to heavily ontological committing 
construals of physical theories-substantivalism about space-time; four-or-more-dimen-
sionalism about space-time; the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics; 
ontically committing interpretations of Feynman's sum-over-histories approach to quan-
tum field theories; etc. 
10. Recall that the sum-over-histories approach is one of several mathematically equiva-
lent methods for solving the Shroedinger (Wheeler-De Witt) equation; its advantages lie 
merely in its technical and conceptual simplicity. 
II. Of course, none of the above should be taken to deny that Hawking might take 
himself to have far more substantive commitments; the point is that one should distinguish 
between what he takes to be his ontic commitments--e.g. to the worlds of the Everett-
Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics-and what one is obliged to take as the 
antic commitments of his model. 
12. Perhaps I should add that I am inclined to favour the first strategy: if it turns out 
that there are independent reasons for supposing that the Hartle-Hawking model is the 
best physical theory-assessed in terms of simplicity, explanatory power, fit with data, 
etc.-then we have good reason to believe in the reality of all the entities which the theory 
quantifies over. However, for current purposes, I don't need to insist on this choice. 
13. I am indebted to John O'Leary-Hawthorne for suggesting the first two examples, 
and for discussion of the issues involved here. 
14. One last possibility is that Craig-following the Thomistic tradition-supposes that 
his kalam cosmological argument has the virtue that it consists of premises which any 
non-theist would grant were she free of the tainting effects of sin and were she to attend 
seriously to them. If this is the case, then my main complaint is that he doesn't say so 
clearly, and at the outset, so that non-theists are made aware: (i) that the argument isn't in 
any sense intended as an internal challenge to their beliefs or rationality; and (ii) that the 
argument is predicated on the assumption that the argument would not be dialectically 
effective for a typical audience of non-theists because that audience is rendered constitu-
tionally incapable of appreciating the argument by the debilitating effect of sin. At this 
point, dialogue is at an end, and rationalisation takes over-as it does when non-theists 
tum to Marx, or Feuerbach, or Nietzsche, or Freud, or other debunking theorists, in order 
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to explain to each other why theists accept false premises. Moreover, there is still the 
further question what the construction of such an argument is supposed to show to theists; 
in particular, there is a hard question about the direction of the doxastic connections 
between (i) the claim that anyone free of the incapacitating influence of sin would accept 
the premises, and (ii) the conclusion, i.e. the claim that God exists. And it is also unclear 
to me why even theists should grant that the premises have the status which this interpre-
tation requires; surely sinless belief in God could perfectly well go along with rejection 
of Craig's controversial physical and metaphysical premises. 
